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Insurance Rate Regulation in
Pennsylvania: Does the
Consumer Have a Voice?
I. Introduction
. With the advent of compulsory insurance schemes such as no-fault
automobile insurance and with the increasing necessity of protection in
high-risk areas like the medical profession, the regulation of insurance
rates has become a matter of vital concern to consumers. Readily available
insurance coverage is now as much a necessity of life as, for example,
economical utility services.
Despite the public's natural interest in reasonable insurance rates,
Pennsylvania's rate-making statutes' make no provision for notice or
hearing before increased rates take effect. The public is thus relegated to
the role of passive observer during the crucial stages of filing of proposed
rate changes by industry rating organizations 2 and review by the Insurance
Commissioner. An aggrieved consumer is forced to wait for the rate
change to become effective before he can question its propriety.
This comment discusses, by analogy to utility termination cases, the
feasibility of a fourteenth amendment due process challenge to the present
insurance rate-making procedures, particularly those relating to fire and
marine, casualty and surety, and workmen's compensation insurance.3 In
order to sustain a valid constitutional argument, the consumer must of
course demonstrate that he has been deprived of a protectible property
interest by state action without due process of law.
Apart from this possible constitutional claim, the aggrieved consumer
may be able to avail himself of various remedies provided by the rate
I. These three types of Insurance embrace similar statutory schemes. Casualty and
surety insurance rates: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1184 (1971); fire, marine and inland marine
insurance: PA STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1224 (1971); workmen's compensation insurance: PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 814 (Supp. 1975), as amended, Act of Dec. 5, 1974, P.L. 782, No. 263, §
16. Rates under Pennsylvania's new "Health Care Services Malpractice Act," PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, 99 1301.101-1301.1006 (Supp. 1976), discussed in Note, Medical Malpractice-A
Question of Insurability, 80 DIcK. L. REV. 594 (1976), are approved by the Insurance
Commissioner in accordance with "The Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Act," PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1181-1199 (1971), by authority of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.803(a)
(Supp. 1976).
2. Rating organizations, or rating bureaus, are "voluntary associations.., organized
by insurance companies or agents for the purpose of promoting the business, welfare, and
convenience of the parties thereto, and to secure uniformity in the business." 43 AM. JUR. 2d
Insurance§ 92 (1969). In Pennsylvania, rating organizations act, inter alia, for their subscribing companies in filing rates with the Insurance Commission. Their formation and activities
are regulated by the Insurance Commissioner in accordance with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§
1186, 1226 and 814 (1971).
3. See note 1 supra.

regulation statutes4 or by Pennsylvania's Administrative Agency Law. 5
The adequacy of these statutory remedies is examined in order to determine
whether legislative action is required to protect more fully the interests of
the insurance consumer.
A.

The History of Insurance Regulation

Since the 1830's the insurance industry has been governmentally
regulated. 6 State supervision, which has been held constitutional because
of the public's interest in insurance matters, 7 was the sole form of
government regulation until 1944, when the Supreme Court ruled in United
States v. South-Eastern UnderwritersAssociation8 that insurance transactions conducted across state lines are interstate commerce, subject to the
regulatory powers of Congress.
The effect of the South-Eastern decision on state regulatory bodies
and insurance companies was alarming. 9 In an effort to allay the fears and
confusion engendered by South-Eastern, Congress passed the McCarranFerguson Act.' 0 The substance of this act was to delay
full application of the antitrust laws for approximately three
years,.thereby granting ample opportunity to the several states to
readjust legislation and to the insurance companies to revise
their practices so as to conform to the new legal conception of
insurance as commerce."
4.

See notes 93-96 and accompanying text infra.

5.
6.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1710.1-.51 (1962).
I G. RICHARDS, LAW OF INSURANCE § 40, at 143 (5th ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as

RICHARDS]. For a historical survey of state and federal insurance regulation, see id. §§ 39-63 at
127-324. Prior to the early nineteenth century, states involved themselves with the insurance
industry only by granting special charters for incorporation and requiring reports as to the
financial status of insurers. A. MOWBRAY & R. BLANCHARD, INSURANCE 490-91 (5th ed. 1961).
7. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914); Commonwealth v.
Vrooman, 164 Pa. 306, 30 A. 217 (1894). In Lewis the Court held that while insurance was a
private business, it was clearly a matter of public interest. The argument that a business is not
one of public concern unless the public has a legal right to demand the service was rejected.
Evidence of public interest in insurance was found in the fact that "in the statutes of every
State in the Union superintendence and control over the business of insurance are exercised,
varying in details and extent." Id. at 412.
8. 322 U.S. 533 (1944). Specifically, the Court held the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1940), applicable to an alleged combination of fire insurance companies in
restraint of trade.
9. As one observer noted,
It opened the door to federal administrative agencies to investigate and to the
Congress to legislate on almost any phase of insurance. It subjected state regulation
and the insurance business to a long line of judicial decisions relative to the
commerce clause of the federal constitution. . . . Finally it led to the widespread
conclusion that insurance executives were open to criminal prosecution under
federal anti-trust laws if they acted in accordance with the requirements of many
state laws.
RICHARDS, supra note 6, § 48, at 177-78. A thorough analysis of the South-Eastern decision
can be found in Comment, Insurance as Commerce in Constitution and Statute, 57 HARV. L.
REV. 937 (1944).
10. Act of March 9, 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33. The intent of the McCarranFerguson Act was expressed in the first paragraph to be that,
The continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of
insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall
not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business
by the several States.
Id. § 1.
I1. Note, Insurance under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 33 GEO. L.J. 321, 322 (1945).

The McCarran-Ferguson Act further provided that when the antitrust
laws did become applicable to the insurance industry, they would do so
only to the extent that the state had not already acted. 2 In effect, the states
were given a grace period during which they were empowered to pre-empt
federal anti-trust laws.' 3 States quickly established control over the
activities of insurance rate-making organizations 14 and, in turn, over the
rates charged by insurance companies. Model rate regulatory bills were
drawn up on behalf of the insurance industry by the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners and the All-Industry Committee and were presented to state legislatures for action during their 1947 sessions. 1 The
Pennsylvania legislature promptly adopted these model bills, with some
modification, as the state's Casualty and Surety, 16 and Fire, Marine and
18
Inland Marine' 7 Rate Regulatory Acts.
B.

Rate Making in Pennsylvania

The avowed purpose of Pennsylvania's Rate Regulatory Acts "is to
promote the public welfare by regulating insurance rates to the end that
they shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory." 9 In
seeking to accomplish this objective, the acts specifically set forth the
20
procedure to be followed in the establishment of rates.
12. Act of March 9, 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-15, § 2(b), 59 Stat. 33, 34.
13. "Since the yardstick of immunity from federal anti-trust laws was deemed to be the
measure of effective State regulation, the States were compelled to act promptly." RICHARDS,
supra note 6, § 52, at 216.
14. Rating organizations created and operated under the active supervision of the state,
as in Pennsylvania, have been held not subject to anti-trust challenge on grounds that they
restrict competition. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 930 (1966). See note 2 supra.
15. RICHARDS, supra note 6, §52, at 217.
16. Act of June 11, 1947, P.L. 538, No. 246.
17. Act of June I1, 1947, P.L. 551, No. 247.
18. By 1950, every state, as well as Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the District of
Columbia, had enacted these model rate regulatory bills, either separately or in combination.
RICHARDS, supra note 6, § 52, at 218-19.
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1181 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1221 (1971). For the
purpose of analyzing these essentially similar acts, citation will be made throughout the
comment first to the Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§
1181-1199 (1971), and second to the Fire, Marine and Inland Marine Rate Regulator Act, PA.
STAT. ANN. titl 40, §§ 1211-1238 (1971).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1184 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1224 (1971). The
Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Act provides that
(a) Every insurer shall file with the Commissioner every manual of classifications,
rules and rates . . . which it proposes to use. Every such filing shall state the
proposed effective date thereof and shall indicate the character and extent of
coverage contemplated ...
(b) An insurer may satisfy its obligations to make such filings by becoming a
member of, or a subscriber to, a licensed rating organization which makes such
filings and by authorizing the Commissioner to accept such filings on its
behalf; . . .
(c) The Commissioner shall review such of the filings as it may be necessary to
review in order to carry out the purposes of this Act.
(d). . . [Elach filing shall be on file for a waiting period of thirty (30) days before it
becomes effective, which period may be extended by the Commissioner for an
additional period not to exceed thirty (30) days upon written notice within such
waiting period to the insurer or rating organization which made the filing. . . . A
filing shall be deemed to meet the requirements of this Act and to become effective
unless disapproved . . . by the Commissioner within the waiting period or any
extension thereof.

Pursuant to these statutes, rating organizations file proposed rate
changes with the Insurance Commissioner for review. If the Commissioner
disapproves the new rates, a 1974 Commonwealth Court decision holds
that he must "specify any deficiencies in the rate filing so as to give the
company some guidelines for future or amended filings. "21 On the other
hand, if the Commissioner approves of the rate proposal, he need not take
any action at all, in which case the filing becomes effective at the end of the
thirty-day waiting period. 22 The procedure for establishing workmen's
compensation insurance rates is essentially the same as for other forms of
insurance, i.e., proposed rate changes are on file for thirty days and then,
unless disapproved, automatically take effect .23
Nowhere in the statutory rate-making scheme is there any provision
for notice and opportunity for a hearing to be given the public prior to the
effective date of an increase. 24 While aggrieved parties may obtain a
hearing with respect to a filing after it becomes effective, 25 the issue arises
whether the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires prior
notice and opportunity for a hearing to be given members of the public
before a requested insurance rate increase takes effect.
II.

Due Process Implications

A.

Consumer Due Process: General Applicability

In whatever factual setting a fourteenth amendment due process
challenge may be found, three elements are necessary in order to sustain a
constitutional claim. First, the court must be able to identify "state action"
in the alleged deprivation. 26 Second, there must be an infringement upon
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1184(1971). The Fire, Marine and Inland Marine Rate Regulatory Act
contains, in all essential respects, identical language. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1224 (1971).
21. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 15 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 24, 33,
324 A.2d 878, 882 (1974).
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1184(d) (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1224(d)(1971). "It
is obvious from a reading of the [Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory] Act that, unlike the
Public Utility Commission, the Insurance Commissioner does not fix rates. Under a strict
reading of this statute, the Commissioner either approves or disapproves a rate filing."
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 15 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 24, 32-33, 324
A.2d 878, 882 (1974).
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 814 (Supp. 1975), as amended by the Act of Dec. 5, 1974,
P.L. 782, No. 263, § 16.
24. See 1974 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 18, reasoning that since there was provision in the
insurance rate acts for appeals by "persons aggrieved" by the Commissioner's decision, such
persons (i.e., the public) had a right to participate in rate hearings. This conclusion is suspect
in light of language in Pittsburgh v. Insurance DepartmentofPa., 448 Pa. 466,473, 294 A.2d
892, 895 (1972), in which Justice Pomeroy noted in his concurring opinion: "The majority
correctly reads this definition [of the term "parties"] as not necessarily granting to all persons
who claim to have a direct interest. . . a right to appear before the administrative agency."
(emphasis in original) More significant, felt Pomeroy, was the distinction between "parties"
and "persons aggrieved": "In this provision the legislature has not used the word "party" to
describe a person who has the right to appeal, but rather has adopted the broader phrase "any
person aggrieved." Id. at 474, 294 A.2d at 895.
The Attorney General's opinion suggests that the Commissioner has considerable
discretion to determine public access to rate filings and, indeed, whether there will be a
hearing at all.
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1185(b) (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1225(b)(1971); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 814 (Supp. 1975).

26. "[lit is. . . well settled that the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment apply
only to state action and not to 'individual invasion of individual rights."' Martin v. Pacific

27
life, liberty or a property interest protected by the fourteenth amendment.
Finally, the court must find28 that the alleged deprivation was imposed
without due process of law.

The heightened sensitivity of the courts in recent years to the due
process claims of consumers is apparent in such cases as Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp.,29 in which the United States Supreme Court held
that a Wisconsin procedure allowing garnishment of a debtor's wages
without prior notice and an opportunity for a hearing was an unconstitutional denial of due process. While Sniadach dealt only with wages, 30 it
may be seen as a theoretical springboard for constitutional challenges to the
deprivation of less obvious property interests. 31 Application of the
Sniadach principle to other factual settings is suspect, however. Unsuccessful attempts have been made to extend the protective arm of the due
process clause to consumers facing increased utility rates without the
32
opportunity to be heard in opposition.
For example, in Holt v. Yonce, 33 electric and gas utility customers
alleged unconstitutionality of South Carolina statutes allowing utility rate
increases to become temporarily effective pending final determination of
their reasonableness by the South Carolina Public Service Commission.
Implementation of the temporary rates was conditioned upon the posting of
a bond by the utility for the purpose of guaranteeing repayment to
customers of any part of the increase found to be unreasonable by the
Commission. 34 Plaintiffs argued that the statutes violated due process in
that they "permit citizens to be deprived, without a hearing, of essential
35
services to which they are rightfully and constitutionally entitled.",
Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 441 F.2d 1116, 1118 (9th Cir. 1971), citingCivil RightsCases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883). See alsoJones v. Buffalo Creek Coal & Coke Co., 245 U.S. 328(1917);work
cited, note 59 infra.

27. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84 (1972).
28. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969). With respect to the
deprivation of an individual's property, due process requires notice and a right to be heard
before the taking. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-82 (1972).
29. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
30. ". . a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic
system." Id. at 340. Sniadach has precipitated a veritable mountain of legal writing, e.g.,
Note, 68 MICH. L. REV. 986 (1970); Note, Some Implications ofSniadach, 70 COLUM.L. REV.
942 (1970).

31. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits without
prior hearing); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension, without prior hearing, of
uninsured motorist's operator's license); and the "utility termination" cases, Bronson v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Stanford v. Gas Serv. Co., 346
F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972); Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972);

Davis v. Weir, 328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Lamb v. Hamblin, 57 F.R.D. 58 (D. Minn.
1972). See note 35 infra.
32. Holt v. Yonce, 370 F. Supp. 374 (D.S.C. 1973), aff'd. mem., 415 U.S. 969 (1974);

Sellers v. Iowa Power and Light Co., 372 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
33.
34.

370 F. Supp. 374 (D.S.C. 1973).
Holt was discussed and analyzed in 26 S.C. L. REV. 525 (1974).

35. 370 F. Supp. at 376. In progressing to this contention, plaintiffs first alleged that,
[T]he practical effect of this procedure is to deprive indigent persons of electric and
gas service, because this group will be unable to pay the increased cost of these
essential services without depriving themselves of other more vital necessities of
life.
Id. Plaintiffs' argument depended heavily on the concept of "entitlement" as developed in the

The court, in rejecting this claim, noted plaintiffs' reliance on the
Sniadach line of cases as well as the utility termination cases.
What the plaintiffs seek would require that this court analogize
an increase in utility rates without a prior hearing to a termination
of utility services without a prior hearing and, thus, hold that
such increase constitutes a deprivation of property within the
concept of the Fuentes-Sniadachline of cases. . . .To so hold
would necessitate that this court extend Sniadach and its progeny to an uncharted point not supported by any cited authority.
We refuse to sanction such an extension.36
In reaching its decision, however, the Holt court relied primarily upon
37
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division,
which involved no constitutional due process issue and predated the
38
Sniadach line of authority.
In Sellers v. Iowa Power and Light Co. 39 a challenge was mounted
similar to that made in Holt.4° The court adopted a two-pronged analysis of
plaintiff's due process arguments. 4' First, the court found ample authority
for the correlative propositions that utility companies have the right to set
their prices as they see fit, absent statutory or contractual restrictions, and
that "utility customers have no vested rights in any fixed utility rates
.... ,,42 Then, assuming arguendo that plaintiff had a constitutionally
protected property interest, the court rejected the due process argument by
weighing the interests of plaintiffs against those of the utility company and
the state.4 3 The court pointed out that plaintiffs were protected to the extent
that any overpayment would be refunded at reasonable interest rates. On
the other hand, the court deemed the collection of the temporary increase
essential to the maintenance of the utility company's service since there
was no practical way of collecting the increase retroactively. Moreover,
the court found the state, on behalf of the general public, to have an interest
in ensuring that the company was sufficiently capitalized to continue to
provide quality service. In sum, the statute was held to embody "a careful
accommodation of the various interests involved."' This "weighing of
interests" analysis was mere dictum, however, in light of the court's initial
finding that the alleged property interest was too tenuous to merit fourpost-Sniadach decisions. See cases cited note 31 supra. By 1972, the constitutional protection
of entitlements was firmly entrenched:
It has now been clearly established that once the state has undertaken to provide a
service to the public. . it must then comply with the requirements of due process
before it can terminate access to such service or benefits in the case of any given
individual. This is the concept of the "entitlement."
Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
36. 370 F. Supp. at 377.
37. 358 U.S. 103 (1958).
38. Sellers v. Iowa Power and Light Co., 372 F. Supp. 1169, 1171 (S.D. Iowa 1974); 26
S.C. L. REV. 525, 529-31 (1974).
39. 372 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
40. 370 F. Supp. 374 (D.S.C. 1973).
41. The property of which plaintiffs were allegedly deprived consisted of the money
required to pay the temporary increase pending final determination as to its reasonableness.
42. 372 F. Supp. at 1172.
43. Id.at 1172-74.
44. Id.at 1173.

teenth amendment protection. Holt and Sellers, which have been cited as
controlling authority in later cases,45 indicate the state of the law at present
with respect to the consumer due process issue in rate-making situations.
B.

Comparisonof Public Utility Regulation with InsuranceRegulation

Before holdings such as Holtand Sellers are applied in the insurance
rate regulation context, it is necessary to compare the nature of state
regulation of public utilities with that of the insurance industry.
1. Underlying Public Interests.-Public regulation of utilities is
deemed essential because of the state's interest in avoiding the economic
waste entailed by a duplication of utility services. Accordingly, states
allow public utilities such as electric, water, gas and telephone companies
to enjoy a local or limited monopoly. This unique status of utilities creates
certain problems for consumers, who are vulnerable to the imposition of
excessive rates and unfavorable regulations. To protect the public, states
establish a system of rate regulation that protects utility consumers from
exorbitant service charges. In addition to protecting consumers, public
utility rate regulation is conducted so as to ensure a fair profit for the utility
itself; otherwise its potential capital supply would be diverted to more
lucrative areas and the quality of its services would deteriorate. 46
State insurance regulation is premised upon different considerations.
Unlike the public utility consumer, the insurance buyer does not pay for a
service that he is presently enjoying. Rather, "the whole value of the
promise sold to the public by insurers lies in future performance. .... If
the contract is to be effective the insurer must be financially able to make
good its promise whenever it becomes liable. 47 The danger of inadequate
resources is accentuated by the highly competitive nature of the industry.
Thus, the primary goal of public regulation of insurance is to see that
insurers carry sufficient reserves to meet their losses.4a
This basic difference between regulation of public utilities and
regulation of the insurance industry was accurately stated in Insurance
4 9 Judge Woodside observed that
Department v. City of Philadelphia.
insurance companies have no monopoly and no guarantee of
customers. The competition is keen. . . If insurance companies were completely unregulated by government, the danger
of undercharging (and thus being unable to pay
5 the losses) might
be greater than the danger of overcharging. 0
45. Hartford Consumer Activists Ass'n v. Hausman, 381 F. Supp. 1275 (D.Conn.
1974); Baker v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n, 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 245,322 A.2d
735 (1-974).
46. The theory behind the regulation of public utilities is discussed in C. CLAY,
REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 3-5 (1932).
47.

A. MOWBRAY & R. BLANCHARD, INSURANCE 485 (5th ed. 1961).

48. Other reasons for supervising the insurance business include the need for control
over company practices and, to a lesser extent, the desirability of regulating the qualifications
of insurance personnel. Id. at 487. See also W. VANCE, HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OF INSURANCE

28-34 (2d ed. 1930).
49. 196 Pa. Super. Ct. 221, 173 A.2d 811 (1961).
50. Id. at 238, 173 A.2d at 820. Judge Woodside noted, on the other hand, that

The best interests of the public call for vigilance against overcharging by
public utilities, while in the insurance field the opposite is true. The desire
to prevent inadequate reserves that may result from undercharging militates in favor of higher rates; the danger of excessive premiums, though
important, is a secondary consideration. 5 Consequently, if consumers are
to be protected, insurance rate regulation requires meaningful public
involvement. Because of the nature of the consumer interests concerned,
insurance rate setting arguably calls for greater public involvement than
does the setting of utility rates.
2. A vailability of Consumer Choice.-The nature of the commodity being purchased gives rise to another important distinction between
utility and insurance rates: the principle of "self-regulation" by consumers
applies to a significantly lesser extent to insurance than to utilities. In
Brown v. Hausman,52 which allowed a temporary bus fare increase
without a hearing, the court discussed whether a "taking" of property was
involved and held that the alleged deprivation (the money required to pay
the increased fare) was so indirect as not to be of the type contemplated by
the fourteenth amendment. In analyzing the deprivation resulting from the
temporary electric utility rate increases at issue in Hol 5 3 and Sellers,5" one
writer noted:
The purchase of utility service in the Holt utility/consumer
relationship is based on the payment of a certain charge per unit
of consumption. The conceptual nature of that purchase is that
the individual consumer determines the extent of his use of the
service, and thus he determines the amount of its cost to him.
This element of consumer choice and self-regulation undercuts
the attempt to characterize
the rate increase as a direct appropri55
ation of money.
The principle of "self-regulation" is inapplicable in the insurance
marketplace for three basic reasons. First, a utility consumer can elect to
forego electric service or at least reduce his use of that commodity, but the
insurance buyer generally has no readily available option. The state may
require that he have insurance in order to engage in a particular activity,
and furthermore, may mandate a minimum amount of coverage. 56
[g]overnment gives utilities a monopoly or a semi-monopoly, forbidding competition except where a need for it is shown. By denying or limiting competition, the
government, in practical effect, guarantees customers to utilities, and in exchange
reserves the right to fix utility rates. Because the services of utility companies are
needed and cannot be obtained elsewhere, unregulated utility companies generally
would have no difficulty in exacting exorbitant sums for their services.
Id. at 238, 173 A.2d at 819-20.
51. "It was for this reason that the regulation of reserves and examinations of
companies for solvency preceded by many years the legal requirement that rates must not be
excessive." Id. at 238, 173 A.2d at 820.
52. Civil No. 15,081 (D. Conn. filed June 21, 1972), discussed at 26 S.C. L. REV. 525,
533 (1974).
53. 370 F. Supp. 374 (D.S.C. 1973).
54. 372 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
55. 26 S.C. L. REV. 525, 533 (1974).
56. No-fault automobile insurance coverage PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1009.101-.701
(Supp. 1975); and silicosis or "miner's asthma" coverage under the Occupational Disease Act

Second, unlike the utility customer, the insurance consumer may be
unable voluntarily to regulate the actual cost of the service to him.
Regardless of how carefully a person operates a motor vehicle, for
example, the statistical base for insurance rates is too large for his or her
individual driving record to have any effect on the future course of rates.
Premiums also vary according to other factors beyond the insured's
control, such as his age or marital status.
Last, the risks entailed in self-regulation may be too great to warrant
the reduction of one's insurance coverage. To carry inadequate fire
insurance on one's home, for example, may jeopardize a major portion of
one's life savings. By contrast, reduction of electricity consumption adds
at most a minor inconvenience to one's daily activities. Thus, for a
consumer to regulate insurance costs may be legally or statistically
impossible, or economically infeasible.
With these differences in mind, the validity of a due process challenge
to Pennsylvania's insurance rate-making scheme is placed in its proper
perspective.
C. Application to Insurance Rate Making in Pennsylvania
As noted earlier, 57 successful fourteenth amendment challenges
require three elements: state action, infringement of a protected interest,
and absence of due process. All three elements impede application of the
fourteenth amendment to insurance rate making in Pennsylvania.
1. State Action.-One might argue that Pennsylvania's participation in the rate-making process constitutes state action, but this argument is
difficult to support in view of recent case law. It is well settled that if a
statute authorizes a state insurance commissioner to fix rates chargeable by
insurance companies, his action in so doing is state action subject to the
constitutional restrictions of due process. 58 The more difficult question is
whether there is state action when a state official merely approves com59
pany-proposed rates.
In Teleco, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 6° the Tenth
Circuit held that state action was lacking in the promulgation of telephone
tariffs under Oklahoma rules providing that tariffs "become effective
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 1208(k), 1405 (Supp. 1975) are good examples. Section 1009.104(a)
of the no-fault insurance law requires every owner of a vehicle registered or operated in
Pennsylvania to carry insurance coverage in specified minimum amounts. Failure to carry the
required coverage is a misdemeanor punishable by fine, imprisonment or both. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.601 (Supp. 1975). Rates for no-fault are established under the Casualty and
Surety Rate Regulatory Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1181-99 (1971), as were automobile
insurance rates previously. The Act provides that "The rates charged for security shall be
established, determined, and modified only in accordance with the provisions of applicable
rating law of this Commonwealth." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.109(a) (Supp. 1975).

57. See notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra.
58. Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 329 Mass. 265, 107
N.E.2d 807 (1952); Jordan v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 169 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
59. See Comment, State Action After Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.:
Analytical Framework for a Restrictive Doctrine, 81 DICK. L. REV. 315 (1976).
60. 511 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1975).

thirty days after they are filed with the [Oklahoma Corporation] Commission. "6 The court stated that since the regulated tariffs "became effective
automatically after the utility had filed them with the state regulatory
agency for a specified period without objection," 62 state action was
lacking.
In reaching its conclusion, the Teleco court relied on Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co. ,63 in which the United States Supreme Court
ruled that the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission's approval of a
utility's general tariff did not constitute state action with respect to
subsequent utility termination pursuant to provisions of the general tariff.
Through a procedure similar to that used in insurance rate making in
Pennsylvania, the Jackson termination rule took effect in sixty days absent
disapproval by the PUC. The Court held that the termination was not state
action when "the sole connection of the Commission with this regulation
was Metropolitan's simple notice filing with the Commission and the lack
of any Commission action to prohibit it. "6' The Jackson holding may be
interpreted as indicating that the failure of a state regulatory agency to
disallow a utility's proposal does not transform subsequent implementation
of the proposal into state action. It may also be interpreted as holding that if
a state-approved regulation has not been the actualsubject of review, even
65
though a hearing was held, state action is lacking.
Jackson and Teleco suggest that Pennsylvania's insurance ratemaking procedure does not fall within the presently accepted meaning of
state action, yet it may be asked whether these decisions would be
considered controlling by a court faced with a due process argument in an
insurance case. The Jackson facts are distinguishable from insurance rate
regulation in that they dealt with utility termination rules that ultimately
affected only that small percentage of customers who failed to pay service
bills or abide by other utility rules. Conversely, all persons who purchase
insurance coverage must pay the established rates or forego such protection. This broader impact might influence a court's determination whether
state action is inherent in Pennsylvania's rate-making structure.
2. Protected Interest.-It is essential to a successful due process
challenge that the alleged deprivation be of a property interest within the
ambit of fourteenth amendment protection. 66 It is well settled that an
"entitlement" such as continued utility service is a constitutionally pro61. Id.at 952.
62. Id.
63. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). See Note, Public Utilities-State Action and Informal Due
Process After Jackson, 53 N.C. L. REV. 817 (1975); work cited note 59 supra.
64. 419 U.S. 345, 355 (1974).
65. This view depends on whether or not the termination provision could have been
challenged at the rate increase hearing. Petitioner in Jackson conceded that the only issue
addressed at the hearing concerned the proposed rate hike, but it is not clear whether the
disputed rule was open to discussion if desired. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1182 (1959) indicates
that it was. The termination provision, having appeared in Metropolitan's tariff provisions for
years, presumably went unnoticed.
66. See note 27 supra.

tected interest. 67 Presently, however, there is no legally recognized property interest in fixed rates for that service.
Brown v. Hausman,68 for example, dealt with a temporary bus fare
increase without a prior hearing. The court stated, " 'It is by no means
clear that customers have a right to procedural due process whenever a state
agency permits an increase in the price of a commodity they wish, or even
need, to purchase.' "69 Brown has been cited as authority for the proposition that consumers have no protected property interest in fixed rates for
utility services. 70 Similarly, the court in Sellers v. Iowa Power and Light
Co. 71 gave considerable attention to the property issue, finding that a
consumer's right to stable utility rates is not an interest protected by the
fourteenth amendment. Subsequent decisions having adopted this
analysis, the Brown-Sellers line of authority appears to be in no danger of
rejection. 72 Although these cases dealt with rate increases in the field of
public utilities, their logic lends authority to the conclusion that insurance
buyers, like utility consumers, have no property interest in fixed rates.
3. Denial of Due Process.-Assuming that a court found
that
Pennsylvania's insurance rate-making scheme worked a deprivation of a
protected property interest by state action, the final question would be
whether the deprivation was accomplished without due process of law. The
minimal requirements of procedural due process are notice and an opportunity for a hearing at a meaningful time."
The "meaningful time" qualification is particularly important in the
present situation since, according to the Rate Regulatory Act, "Any person
or organization aggrieved with respect to any filing which is in effect may
make written application to the Commissioner for a hearing
thereon. . . .. The Acts clarify this by later providing that the seemingly discretionary hearing is actually a matter of right. 75 A 1958 Pennsylvania Superior Court decision makes it clear that an insurance consumer is
a person aggrieved and, therefore, is entitled to a hearing before the
"7

67. See cases cited note 31 supra; note 35 and accompanying text supra.
68. Civil No. 15,081 (D. Conn., June 21, 1972). Brown is discussed in Hartford
Consumers Activists Ass'n v. Hausman, 381 F. Supp. 1275, 1281 (D. Conn. 1974) and at 26 S.
C. L. REV. 525, 533 (1974).
69. Brown v. Hausman (per Newman, J.), quoted in Hartford Consumer Activists
Ass'n v. Hausman, 381 F. Supp. 1275, 1281 (D. Conn. 1974).
70. Hartford Consumer Activists Ass'n v. Hausman, 381 F. Supp. 1275 (1974). "Courts
have yet to hold that a state agency's approval of a utility rate increase involves a deprivation
... Id. at 1281.
of a customer's property interest.
71. 372 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D. Iowa 1974). See notes 39-44 and accompanying text supra.
72. See Hartford Consumer Activists Ass'n v. Hausman, 381 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Conn.
1974); Baker v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 245, 322 A.2d
735 (1974). See also, Georgia Power Co. v. Allied Chemical Corp., 233 Ga. 558, 212 S. E.2d 628
(1975). Though not citing the Sellers line of cases, the court in Georgia Power dismissed a
substantive due process claim that utility rates were too high as an allegation not suited to
judicial determination. The court further noted that, "[T]he consumer has no 'property' right
in the rate he pays for utilities." 233 Ga. at 561, 212 S.E.2d at 631.
73. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1185(b) (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1225(b) (1972)
(emphasis added).
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1197(a) (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1236(a) (1971).

Insurance Commissioner.76 The question then becomes whether the right
to a hearing after the rate becomes effective satisfies the due process
requirement.
This issue was addressed in Jordan v. American Eagle FireInsurance
Co.,7 although in that case an insurance carrier rather than an insured
sought injunction of an order adjusting fire insurance rates. The court held
that due process applies with respect to a reduction in rates 7 8 and that a
hearing was required, but with an important qualification:
[W]here the requisite due process hearing is not included in the
legislative or administrative process, it may be adequately sup-

plied by a [post-order] judicial proceeding in which new evidence

may be supplied and full opportunity afforded for exploration
of the bases of the disputed order.79

If a post-order hearing satisfies due process requirements vis-a-vis an
insurance carrier, it should also be constitutionally sound with respect to
consumers, whose property interest in fixed insurance rates is more
80
tenuous than that of insurers.
The Jordan court further noted that,
[I]n modern times, most states, like the federal government,
provide for a full hearing in the course of the administrative
consideration, thus making that proceeding quasi-judicial. In
such instances the addition of a judicial review of the record,
findings and conclusions made below, constitutes a combination
81
of actions which satisfies the requirements of due process.

The Pennsylvania insurance rate-making scheme follows the Jordanprocedure very closely. Any aggrieved party can, after an order goes into effect,
gain a hearing before the Commissioner on the grounds for the rate
increase. 82 The hearing must be conducted in accordance with the
Administrative Agency Law, 83 which provides for the type of "full
hearing" mentioned in Jordan.84 Moreover, parties to the hearing have the
right to appeal the Commissioner's decision to the Commonwealth
Court.85
The Jordancase strongly indicates that Pennsylvania's rate-making
procedure affords due process to consumers. Nevertheless, assuming that a
76. Genkinger v. City of New Castle, 188 Pa. Super. Ct. 229, 146 A.2d 640 (1958).
77. 169 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
78. Unlike the Sellers consumer-plaintiffs, the insurance company in Jordan clearly
held a property interest in the rates it charged.
79. 169 F.2d at 289.
80. See notes 66-72 and accompanying text supra.
81. 169 F.2d at 290.
82. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1197(a) (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1236(a)(1971); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 814 (Supp. 1975).
83. The Administrative Agency Law is found in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1710.11710.51 (1962). These provisions apply by directive of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1197(b) (197 1),
and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1236(b) (1971).
84. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.31-.33 (1962).
85. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1197(c) (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1236(c)(1971);PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 814 (Supp. 1975). By these act,$, jurisdiction of the appeal was originally
vested in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas. This jurisdiction was transferred to
the Commonwealth Court by the Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, No. 223, §§ 508(a)(26), (74)
and (75), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 211.508(a)(26), (74) and (75) (Supp. 1975).

court found a protectable property interest and the requisite state action, the
87
decisions in Holt v. Yonce 86 and Sellers v. Iowa Power and Light Co.
could easily be distinguished. In those cases, the utility rate increases were
temporary and, more importantly, hearings and review by the state
regulatory agency were necessary before the interim rate hikes could take
final effect. Furthermore, consumers in Holt and Sellers were provided
additional protection by the requirement that the utilities post a bond to
88
cover overpayment in the event their requests were not approved in full.
Consumer safeguards are conspicuously absent from Pennsylvania's insurance rate-making scheme. 89 Increases are final within thirty days, without
any required hearings, and insurers are not obliged to post bonds guaranteeing refunds to consumers in the event a later hearing results in a rate
reduction.
D. Summary
Pennsylvania's insurance rate regulation procedure, despite its failure
to provide for public notice and hearing before rates go into effect, does not
appear susceptible to challenge under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. It is unlikely that a court would consider the state's
role in the process to constitute state action. Nor, if the public utility
analogy is employed,' do consumers have a property interest in fixed
insurance rates. On the other hand, were a court to be faced with the
constitutional issue discussed here, it would be advised to note that distinct
public policy arguments as well as practical differences existing in the
insurance field may warrant an independent due process examination.
The lack of serious constitutional objections to the present ratemaking scheme suggests that the resolution of the problem may lie in
legislative rather than judicial hands. As noted, practical policy considerations justify legislative review of the rate-making statutes with a view
toward providing some public forum for discussion of rate filings before
they take effect. The remarks of the Florida Supreme Court in Robbins v.
Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co. 9 1 are appropriate in this regard:
This Court and the Supreme Court of the United States have
repeatedly held that the public is vitally interested in all regulations of administrative boards fixing prices for services or commodities and that such notice and hearing must be given the
public in strict compliance with the law. The law must require
86. 370 F. Supp. 374 (D.S.C. 1973). See notes 33-38 and accompanying text supra.
87. 372 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D. Iowa 1974). See notes 39-44 and accompanying text supra.
88. The concept of allowing atemporary increase inrates under bond is a common one.
See Sellers v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 372 F. Supp. 1169, 1171 n. 2 (S.D. Iowa 1974), in which
the court cited eight federal and fifteen state statutes containing this type of provision.
89. See notes 21-25 and accompanying text supra. Recent Supreme Court cases reveal
judicial sensitivity to the availability of such safeguards. Compare Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972), with Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). In Mitchell, a
sequestration statute was held constitutional largely because of its bond requirement and its
proivison for an immediate hearing after the seizure.
90. See notes 66-72 and accompanying text supra.
91. 153 Fla. 822, 16 So. 2d 121 (1943).

notice and give opportunity to be heard; it is not enough that the
public get it by chance. Otherwise the requirements of due
process fail. 92
III.

Remedies of Aggrieved Parties

A.

Remedies Provided by the Rate Regulation Statutes

When confronted with a no-notice increase in insurance rates, the
insurance consumer may pursue several courses of action other than a
direct constitutional challenge. Various remedies are provided within the
93
rate-making statutes themselves.
First, an aggrieved insured can gain information from the rating
organization concerning its rating system. Additionally, he can request a
hearing on the specific application of the rates to him. Actions taken by the
rating organization subsequent to the hearing may be appealed to the
Insurance Commissioner.

94

Alternatively, an aggrieved party may choose to begin remedial
action after the rate becomes effective by filing a complaint with the
Insurance Commissioner and exercising his right to a hearing before the
Commissioner. When a hearing is scheduled, the Commissioner has the
discretion to suspend the rate increase pending the outcome of the hearing. 95 If the party is still aggrieved after this hearing, he may appeal the
Commissioner's decision to the commonwealth court.9 6
B.

Remedies Under the Administrative Agency Law

Pennsylvania's Administrative Agency Law 97 provides that "[n]o
adjudication shall be valid as to any party unless he shall have been
afforded reasonable notice of a hearing and an opportunity to be heard. "98
The present method of setting insurance rates may be found invalid under
this statute99 if the approval of a rate increase can be considered an
"adjudication"l°0 and aggrieved insureds are deemed to be "parties"' 0 '
within the meaning of the act.
92. Id. at 824, 16 So. 2d at 122. The Supreme Court of Florida cited no United States
Supreme Court cases so holding, however. While the weight to be accorded this statement in
deciding whether due process protections extend to the insurance consumer is minimal
(Robbins was not cited by any court in the Holt-Sellersline of decisions), it does recognize that
the public interest in rate making is sufficient to warrant public participation in the early stages
of the process, i.e., before the increase goes into effect.
93. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1184(1971);PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,§ 1224(1971);PA. SAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 814 (Supp. 1975).
94. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1189 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1229 (1971). These
initial remedies are not provided in the case of workmen's compensation insurance. See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 814 (Supp. 1975).
95. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1197(a) (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1236(a) (1971); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 814 (Supp. 1975).
96. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1197(c); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1236(c) (1971); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 814 (Supp. 1975). See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
97. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1710.1-.51 (1962).
98. Id., § 1710.31.
99. Adjudications of the Insurance Department are clearly governed by the provisions
of the Administrative Agency Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.51(a)(3) (Supp. 1975).
100. According to the Act,
'Adjudication' means any final order, decree, decision, determination or ruling by

The definition of the term "adjudication," as it is used in The
Administrative Agency Law, was considered by the commonwealth court
in Pittsburgh v. Insurance Commissioner.10 2 Blue Cross sought a rate
increase and, in review of that request, the Insurance Commissioner held a
public hearing at which representatives of Allegheny County and the City
of Pittsburgh 10 3 were allowed to make statements concerning the proposed
rate hike, but were refused permission to cross-examine Blue Cross
representatives. To this limitation the city and county objected, claiming a
violation of the due process provisions of the Administrative Agency Law.
The court addressed the issue of whether the Commissioner's hearing for
approval of a rate increase was an "adjudication" or a "regulation" and
held that it was an "adjudication" in which an opportunity for crossexamination was required. "It was a proceeding to determine specifically
whether an individual non-profit corporation would be entitled in a specific
geographic area to a specific rate increase. This has all the earmarks of a
judicial function ...
."1104
The court further declared that the distinction between "adjudication" and "regulation" lay not in what was affected by the action, but
rather who was affected.
The definition of adjudication refers to "parties." The definition
of "regulation" refers to rules or regulations of "general
application."
We cannot call the decision making involved in this proceeding a legislative function when it affects specific parties, namely,
Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, a corporation under the
laws of Pennsylvania, and people who are subscribers to the
insurance sold by Blue Cross ....

Pittsburghwas reversed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania °6 on
the grounds that the city and county had no standing to challenge the
procedures followed by the Insurance Department in acting on a rate filing.
The court thus did not consider whether the approval of rates was an
an agency affecting personal or property rights, privileges, immunities or obligations of any or all of the parties to the proceeding in which the adjudication is
made ...
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.2(a) (Supp. 1975).
101. " 'Party' means any person who appears in a proceeding before an agency who has
a direct interest in the subject matter of such proceeding." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.2(c)
(1962).
102. 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 262, 286 A.2d 475 (1971), rev'd. on other grounds, 448 Pa.
466, 294 A.2d 892 (1972).
103. Pittsburgh and Allegheny County asserted standing to participate on two grounds:
(i) as representatives of individual subscribers and (2) as consumers, by virtue of the city's
contributions to Blue Cross coverage of its employees. Id. at 269, 286 A.2d at 478-79.
104. Id. at 267, 286 A.2d at 477. For other factual settings in which the definition of
"adjudication" has been construed, see Conestoga Nat'l Bank of Lancaster v. Patterson, 442
Pa. 289, 275 A.2d 6 (1971) (Department of Banking decision on a branch bank application is an
adjudication); McKinley v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors, 5 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 42, 288
A.2d 840 (1972) (Board's advisory letter, based on submitted hypothetical facts, not an
adjudication).
105. 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 268, 286 A.2d at 478 (1971). Contra, Insurance Co. of
North America v. Commonwealth, 15 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 460, 327 A.2d 411 (1974),
(regulations of general application promulgated by the Insurance Department held not to be
"adjudications").
106. Pittsburgh v. Insurance Dep't, 448 Pa. 466, 294 A.2d 892 (1972).

adjudication under the Administrative Agency Law. Justice Pomeroy
clarified his concurrence with the majority by stating that he did not take
107
the holding to be decisive of the adjudication issue.
The precedential weight of Pittsburgh v. Insurance Commissioneris
affected by the fact that the decision dealt with an insurance rate increase
that required formal approval by the Insurance Commissioner. The question remains whether the mere failure of the Commissioner to disapprove
rate increases before they go into effect constitutes an "adjudication."
Several Pennsylvania insurance cases have discussed this system of rate
10 8
which
regulation. In Insurance Department v. City of Philadelphia,
involved a rate increase under the Fire, Marine and Inland Marine Rate
Regulatory Act,'09 the court noted that the Act requires the Commissioner
to review the filing and the law presumes that he has done so. 110 The court
spoke of the Commissioner as having "deliberately permitted the filing to
become effective"" 1 I and held that proposed insurance rate increases do
not go into effect merely due to a lack of disapproval. Since the Commissioner has an affirmative duty to examine and review the filing, the rates
become effective in thirty days only by his voluntary, though tacit,
approval. This view of the nature of the Commissioner's action is supported by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth," 2 in
which the court observed, in regard to a rate increase filed under the
Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Act" 3 that "[u]nder a strict reading
of this statute, the Commissioner either approves or disapproves a rate
4
filing. 11
These cases indicate that when a fire, casualty or workmen's compensation insurance rate increase goes into effect in Pennsylvania, it does so
with the Insurance Commissioner's actual approval, just as his formal
approval was required in Pittsburgh v. Insurance Commissioner.115 Thus,
if the holding of that case is applied, there is an adjudication within the
meaning of the Administrative Agency Law in Pennsylvania's rate-making
scheme. Such an adjudication requires that a party against whom enforcement is sought be afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the
decision. Otherwise, the imposition of the rate increase is not valid as to
that party. 116
In reversing the lower court in Pittsburghv. InsuranceCommissioner,
the supreme court held that "parties" who were entitled to the provisions
of Administrative Agency Law were to be determined by reference to the
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 474, 294 A.2d at 895.
196 Pa. Super. Ct. 221, 173 A.2d 811 (1961).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1221-1238 (1971).
196 Pa. Super. Ct. at 241, 173 A.2d at 821.

111.

Id.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

15 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 24, 324 A.2d 878 (1974).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1184(d) (1971).
15 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 32-33, 324 A.2d at 882.
4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 262, 286 A.2d 475 (1971).
See note 98 and accompanying text supra.

particular act under which the rates were regulated-in that case the
Nonprofit Hospital Plan Act. " 7 Since that Act gave the right to participate
in or to appeal the Commissioner's decision only to applicants for rate
increases, the court reasoned that neither subscribers nor their representatives were "parties" within the intended meaning of the Administrative
8
Agency Law."
This analysis of the term "parties" presents difficulties in securing
the protection of the Administrative Agency Law for insurance consumers.
Pennsylvania's rate statutes make no provision for public participation in a
rate filing prior to its effective date; instead, the statutes implicitly refer to
participants as including only insurers, rating organizations and the Commissioner.1 19 Consequently, in the case of a consumer challenge to
insurance rate procedures, the courts are likely to adopt the reasoning of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Pittsburgh in defining "parties":
The Legislature provided that only applicants for rate
approvals participate in the proceedings before the Insurance
Department. . . . Appellees have presented no legal basis or
authority for disregarding the express mandate of the Legislature to limit participation in these proceedings to the 'applicant'
nor are we empowered to ignore this command of the
Legislature. 120
Thus, while Pittsburghsuggests that the Commissioner's approval of a rate
increase is an "adjudication," it casts serious doubt whether insurance
consumers and their representatives are "parties" to whom the minimal
requirements of due process will be extended under the Administrative
Agency Law.
IV.

Conclusion

A due process challenge to Pennsylvania's rate-making statutes
would stand little chance of success. As indicated by recent federal
decisions, both state action and protected property interests in insurance
rates are lacking. 12 1 A successful challenge to the rate-making procedure is
only slightly more likely under the Administrative Agency Law, 122 which,
if the allowance of a rate hike were deemed an adjudication, would
23
arguably require prior notice and a hearing to be afforded the public.1
Alternatively, parties aggrieved by a rate increase may seek remedial
24
action pursuant to the rate-making statutes themselves. 1
Provision for consumer participation in the rate regulation process
should be the immediate object of legislative attention. Extension to the
117. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1401-09 (1971).
118. Pittsburgh v. Insurance Dep't, 448 Pa. 446, 473, 294 A.2d 892, 895 (1972).
119. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1184-85 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1224-25(1971);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 814 (Supp. 1975).
120. Pittsburgh v. Insurance Dep't, 448 Pa. 466, 471-72, 294 A.2d 892, 894 (1972)
(emphasis in original).
121. See notes 57-72 and accompanying text supra.
122. PA STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.1-51 (1962).
123. See notes 97-120 and accompanying text supra.
124. See notes 93-96 and accompanying text supra.

public of adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard should be
expressly mandated in Pennsylvania's rate-making statutes rather than left
to the Commissioner's discretion. 125 It is urged that the General Assembly
address the issue of who may properly represent the insurance-consuming public at rate hearings in order to avoid results 26such as those in
Pittsburgh v. Insurance Department of Pennsylvania.1
This proposal is in keeping with the spirit of the rate statutes. Since the
insurance department is directed to regulate rates "to promote the public
welfare," 127 it seems illogical to exclude from participation in rate increase
decisions representatives of the very group that should be protected. In the
final analysis the extent to which a person should be enabled to advocate his
position in administrative proceedings "should depend upon his ability to
present and develop the facts which the agency is required to take into
consideration .... " 128 If the role of the insurance consumer is measured
by this yardstick, the legislature must acknowledge that responsible
representatives of the subscribing public should be permitted a voice in
hearings on requests for insurance rate increases.

SAM W. LEWIS

125. See note 24 supra.
126. 448 Pa. 466, 294 A.2d 892 (1972). With reference to standing to represent the public,
see Ruben, The Administrative Agency Law: Reform of Adjudicative Procedureand The
Revised Model Act, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 388, 394-96 (1963).
127. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1181 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN, tit. 40, § 1221 (1971).
128. Ruben, The Administrative Agency Law: Reform of Adjudicative Procedure and
The Revised Model Act, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 388, 392 (1963).

